In the absence of royal initiative in England, however, there were
others who were willing and able to wield the strength derived from a
force of ships to intervene in the increasingly complex struggles
between competing factions and claimants to the throne. This is most
clearly seen in the case of the Earl of Warwick, but the Duke of
Burgundy and the king of France were also prepared to provide naval
forces to support their favoured candidate for the English throne.
Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick had been captain of Calais since
1456 and had taken the opportunity afforded by a relatively secure base
to build up a squadron of ships. These were used in the manner most
likely to advance the fortunes of the Earl himself and the Yorkist
cause, which, at that time, he supported. To many English men his naval
exploits in the Channel were a welcome sign of ‘enterprise upon the
see’. Jack Cade’s proclamation in 1450 at the outset of the Kentish
rebellion had bewailed the facts that, ‘the sea is lost, France is
lost’. The French raid on Sandwich in August 1457 had been a humiliating
reminder of the impotence of English defence. Now John Bale, himself a
merchant and a ship-owner, could laud Warwick in his chronicle, praising
his ‘greet pollecy and dedes doyng of worship in fortefieng of Cales
and other feates of armes’. To modern writers Warwick’s deeds seem at
least semi-piratical but to his contemporaries his attack on a Spanish
squadron of 28 sail off Calais in early June 1458 and his taking of
around 17 prizes out of the Hanse fleet returning with Bay salt later
the same summer were victories to savour. It even seems not to have
affected his reputation that the first engagement was not entirely
successful. John Jernyngham’s letter to Margaret Paston which gives
details of the encounter, recounts how he and his crew boarded a large
Spanish ship but were unable to hold her. He concludes, ‘and for sooth
we were well and truly beat’. The point to contemporaries was that
Warwick, who was in fact bound by an indenture of November 1457 to keep
the seas, seemed to be acting energetically and speedily even if not all
his opponents were clearly ‘the londes adversaries’.
His activities in 1459 and 1460 demonstrate with greater force the
way in which the possession of a squadron of ships with experienced
crews was greatly to the political advantage of both Warwick personally
and the Yorkist cause. After plundering Spanish and Genoese shipping in
the Straits in the summer of 1459, Warwick, who had joined the Yorkists
in England, seemed to have miscalculated when he was forced to flee from
the battle of Ludford Bridge. He reached his base in Calais safely,
however, and from that point acted with great skill. Lord Rivers and Sir
Gervase Clifton for the king had by December managed to impound
Warwick’s ships in Sandwich harbour. The Crown also mustered a small
force under William Scott to patrol off Winchelsea to repel any attack
by Warwick.
Warwick had many friends in the Southern counties, perhaps
beneficiaries of his earlier actions in the Channel. Through them he was
well aware of the Crown’s plans. In January a force from Calais
commanded by John Dinham, slipped into Sandwich early in the morning,
while Rivers was still abed, and persuaded Warwick’s erstwhile
shipmasters and crews to return with them to Calais. The royal
government attempted to counter this loss by commissioning further
forces to serve at sea against Warwick. The Duke of Exeter in May 1460
in fact encountered Warwick’s fleet at some point to the east of
Dartmouth and arguably had the opportunity at least to damage very
severely the Yorkist cause if not put paid to it entirely. Yet as the
Great Chronicle of London put it ‘they fowght not’. Richmond sees this
as ‘one of those critical moments when action was essential but was not
forthcoming’. In his view Warwick had what the Crown did not, a fleet
and a fleet which was used to keep the sea. The use of that fleet was an
important factor in the course taken by the domestic politics of
England and to Richmond sealed the fate of the Lancastrians.
In 1470, Warwick was personally in a much weaker position. He may
still have had some vessels of his own; on his flight from England,
after the failure of his intrigues on behalf of the Duke of Clarence,
pursued by Lord Howard, he had taken prizes from the Burgundians. He
could not, however from his own resources hope to mount an invasion of
England to restore his new master Henry VI. He and Queen Margaret were
dependent on the aid of Louis XI of France to provide such a fleet. This
aid was forthcoming because of the seeming advantage to France in the
restoration of the Lancastrians and their adherence to an alliance
against Burgundy. Both English and Burgundian naval forces, however,
were at sea all summer in an endeavour to keep Warwick’s French fleet in
port.
Their efforts seemed successful; by August Warwick’s men were
demanding their pay and the people of Barfleur and Valognes had had
enough of their presence. A summer gale then dispersed the Yorkist ships
at sea and Warwick sailed across unopposed landing on 9 September near
Exeter. By the end of the month Edward IV was himself a fugitive
restlessly watching the North Sea from his refuge at Bruges with Louis
de Gruthuyse, the Burgundian governor of Holland. If he in his turn was
to regain his throne his need also was for ships. The Duke of Burgundy
was perhaps more discreet in his support for his brother-in-law than
Louis XI had been for his cousin, Margaret of Anjou. In March 1471,
however, Edward left Flushing with 36 ships and about 2000 men and once
ashore at Ravenspur by guile and good luck recovered his Crown.
In the 20 or so years from 1455, therefore, it can be argued that the
possession of the potential for naval warfare could be of great
advantage to those who wished to be major players in both internal and
external politics. No very great or glorious encounters between the
vessels of rival powers took place in the Channel or the North Sea. The
typical action was that of the commerce raider; a brief violent boarding
action ending probably in the surrender of the weaker crew in an
attempt to save their skins. Kings and other rulers possessed very few
or no ships of their own and were reliant on the general resources of
the maritime community. Yet, despite this, the perception of the
pressure, which could be exerted by a fleet in being, was more widely
appreciated. Warwick has been held up as the individual whose actions
demonstrate this most clearly and it is hard to argue against this
opinion.
He, perhaps, until the fatal moment on the field at the battle
of Barnet, also had luck. Would he have fared well if Exeter had
attacked off Dartmouth in 1460? The reasons for Exeter’s loss of nerve
are not really clear. Exeter had many warships including the Grace Dieu,
built by John Tavener of Hull and formerly Warwick’s own flagship. The
Great Chronicle of London speaks vaguely of Exeter’s crews being
unwilling to oppose Warwick while the English Chronicle states baldly
that Exeter was afraid to fight. Waurin, a Burgundian chronicler, has a
circumstantial account of Warwick approaching the coming conflict with
great circumspection, sending out fast small vessels ahead of the main
fleet to gather intelligence and then calling a council of war of all
his ship masters.47 The decision was taken to attack with vigour and
maybe the sight of Warwick’s ships coming on at speed with the advantage
of the wind terrified Exeter. His lack of courage was certainly a
disastrous blow for his party.
On a wider canvas, the situation in these waters as far as the
relations between rulers goes has become much more open. In the first
third of the century the conflict between England and France was the
dominant factor with other states being drawn in as allies of one or the
other combatant. After the middle of the century states pursued their
own commercial and political interests in a more fluid situation. Naval
power was diffuse, not necessarily concentrated in government hands, and
the advantage might swing quickly from one state or group of traders to
another.
