Monday, March 14, 2016
NAVAL FORCES AS A POLITICAL WEAPON – THE WARS OF THE ROSES
In the absence of royal initiative in England, however, there were others who were willing and able to wield the strength derived from a force of ships to intervene in the increasingly complex struggles between competing factions and claimants to the throne. This is most clearly seen in the case of the Earl of Warwick, but the Duke of Burgundy and the king of France were also prepared to provide naval forces to support their favoured candidate for the English throne.
Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick had been captain of Calais since 1456 and had taken the opportunity afforded by a relatively secure base to build up a squadron of ships. These were used in the manner most likely to advance the fortunes of the Earl himself and the Yorkist cause, which, at that time, he supported. To many English men his naval exploits in the Channel were a welcome sign of ‘enterprise upon the see’. Jack Cade’s proclamation in 1450 at the outset of the Kentish rebellion had bewailed the facts that, ‘the sea is lost, France is lost’. The French raid on Sandwich in August 1457 had been a humiliating reminder of the impotence of English defence. Now John Bale, himself a merchant and a ship-owner, could laud Warwick in his chronicle, praising his ‘greet pollecy and dedes doyng of worship in fortefieng of Cales and other feates of armes’. To modern writers Warwick’s deeds seem at least semi-piratical but to his contemporaries his attack on a Spanish squadron of 28 sail off Calais in early June 1458 and his taking of around 17 prizes out of the Hanse fleet returning with Bay salt later the same summer were victories to savour. It even seems not to have affected his reputation that the first engagement was not entirely successful. John Jernyngham’s letter to Margaret Paston which gives details of the encounter, recounts how he and his crew boarded a large Spanish ship but were unable to hold her. He concludes, ‘and for sooth we were well and truly beat’. The point to contemporaries was that Warwick, who was in fact bound by an indenture of November 1457 to keep the seas, seemed to be acting energetically and speedily even if not all his opponents were clearly ‘the londes adversaries’.
His activities in 1459 and 1460 demonstrate with greater force the way in which the possession of a squadron of ships with experienced crews was greatly to the political advantage of both Warwick personally and the Yorkist cause. After plundering Spanish and Genoese shipping in the Straits in the summer of 1459, Warwick, who had joined the Yorkists in England, seemed to have miscalculated when he was forced to flee from the battle of Ludford Bridge. He reached his base in Calais safely, however, and from that point acted with great skill. Lord Rivers and Sir Gervase Clifton for the king had by December managed to impound Warwick’s ships in Sandwich harbour. The Crown also mustered a small force under William Scott to patrol off Winchelsea to repel any attack by Warwick.
Warwick had many friends in the Southern counties, perhaps beneficiaries of his earlier actions in the Channel. Through them he was well aware of the Crown’s plans. In January a force from Calais commanded by John Dinham, slipped into Sandwich early in the morning, while Rivers was still abed, and persuaded Warwick’s erstwhile shipmasters and crews to return with them to Calais. The royal government attempted to counter this loss by commissioning further forces to serve at sea against Warwick. The Duke of Exeter in May 1460 in fact encountered Warwick’s fleet at some point to the east of Dartmouth and arguably had the opportunity at least to damage very severely the Yorkist cause if not put paid to it entirely. Yet as the Great Chronicle of London put it ‘they fowght not’. Richmond sees this as ‘one of those critical moments when action was essential but was not forthcoming’. In his view Warwick had what the Crown did not, a fleet and a fleet which was used to keep the sea. The use of that fleet was an important factor in the course taken by the domestic politics of England and to Richmond sealed the fate of the Lancastrians.
In 1470, Warwick was personally in a much weaker position. He may still have had some vessels of his own; on his flight from England, after the failure of his intrigues on behalf of the Duke of Clarence, pursued by Lord Howard, he had taken prizes from the Burgundians. He could not, however from his own resources hope to mount an invasion of England to restore his new master Henry VI. He and Queen Margaret were dependent on the aid of Louis XI of France to provide such a fleet. This aid was forthcoming because of the seeming advantage to France in the restoration of the Lancastrians and their adherence to an alliance against Burgundy. Both English and Burgundian naval forces, however, were at sea all summer in an endeavour to keep Warwick’s French fleet in port.
Their efforts seemed successful; by August Warwick’s men were demanding their pay and the people of Barfleur and Valognes had had enough of their presence. A summer gale then dispersed the Yorkist ships at sea and Warwick sailed across unopposed landing on 9 September near Exeter. By the end of the month Edward IV was himself a fugitive restlessly watching the North Sea from his refuge at Bruges with Louis de Gruthuyse, the Burgundian governor of Holland. If he in his turn was to regain his throne his need also was for ships. The Duke of Burgundy was perhaps more discreet in his support for his brother-in-law than Louis XI had been for his cousin, Margaret of Anjou. In March 1471, however, Edward left Flushing with 36 ships and about 2000 men and once ashore at Ravenspur by guile and good luck recovered his Crown.
In the 20 or so years from 1455, therefore, it can be argued that the possession of the potential for naval warfare could be of great advantage to those who wished to be major players in both internal and external politics. No very great or glorious encounters between the vessels of rival powers took place in the Channel or the North Sea. The typical action was that of the commerce raider; a brief violent boarding action ending probably in the surrender of the weaker crew in an attempt to save their skins. Kings and other rulers possessed very few or no ships of their own and were reliant on the general resources of the maritime community. Yet, despite this, the perception of the pressure, which could be exerted by a fleet in being, was more widely appreciated. Warwick has been held up as the individual whose actions demonstrate this most clearly and it is hard to argue against this opinion.
He, perhaps, until the fatal moment on the field at the battle of Barnet, also had luck. Would he have fared well if Exeter had attacked off Dartmouth in 1460? The reasons for Exeter’s loss of nerve are not really clear. Exeter had many warships including the Grace Dieu, built by John Tavener of Hull and formerly Warwick’s own flagship. The Great Chronicle of London speaks vaguely of Exeter’s crews being unwilling to oppose Warwick while the English Chronicle states baldly that Exeter was afraid to fight. Waurin, a Burgundian chronicler, has a circumstantial account of Warwick approaching the coming conflict with great circumspection, sending out fast small vessels ahead of the main fleet to gather intelligence and then calling a council of war of all his ship masters.47 The decision was taken to attack with vigour and maybe the sight of Warwick’s ships coming on at speed with the advantage of the wind terrified Exeter. His lack of courage was certainly a disastrous blow for his party.
On a wider canvas, the situation in these waters as far as the relations between rulers goes has become much more open. In the first third of the century the conflict between England and France was the dominant factor with other states being drawn in as allies of one or the other combatant. After the middle of the century states pursued their own commercial and political interests in a more fluid situation. Naval power was diffuse, not necessarily concentrated in government hands, and the advantage might swing quickly from one state or group of traders to another.
Duration of Military Campaigns – WARS OF THE ROSES
Although warfare between Englishmen for control of the government or
possession of the Crown occurred from the 1450s to the 1490s, fighting
was not continuous throughout the period. The military campaigns of the
WARS OF THE ROSES were few, intermittent, and brief.
From the first Battle of ST. ALBANS in May 1455 to the Battle of STOKE in June 1487, adherents of the houses of LANCASTER and YORK engaged in thirteen major battles, such as those at TOWTON, BARNET, and BOSWORTH FIELD; several smaller encounters, such as the Battles of TWT HILL and HEXHAM; and numerous raids, rebellions, and assaults on castles. However, most of this fighting across a span of more than thirty years was compressed into a few active phases of two to three years, within which large armed forces were actually in the field for only a matter of weeks. The main periods of active campaigning occurred between the autumn of 1459 and the spring of 1461, the summer of 1469 and the spring of 1471, and in the autumn of 1483 and the summers of 1485 and 1487.
Being an island kingdom, England had not experienced the nearly continuous warfare that the HUNDRED YEARS WAR and other conflicts and rebellions had brought in the previous century to FRANCE, BURGUNDY, and other continental states. As a result, England lacked the standing armies (and the arbitrary taxation that supported them) that had developed in France under CHARLES VII and in Burgundy under Dukes PHILIP and CHARLES. The only ongoing military establishments in fifteenth-century England were a royal bodyguard of 200 archers created in 1468, the 1,000-man CALAIS garrison, and the forces raised at Crown expense by the wardens of the marches to defend the borders with SCOTLAND. The important role that elements of the Calais garrison had in the outcome of several battles, such as LUDFORD BRIDGE in 1459, illustrated how nonmilitarized England was.
This lack of military experience meant that England lagged behind the continent in the use of ARTILLERY and handguns and in the development of military fortification. Whereas an avoidance of pitched battle and a highly developed siegecraft characterized continental warfare, the Wars of the Roses witnessed almost no sieges, no sacks of major towns, little pillage or destruction of the countryside, and a series of brief campaigns and pitched battles, the winner of which usually gained immediate control of the government. In his MEMOIRS, the Burgundian chronicler Philippe de Commines observed that the English “were the most inclined to give battle” and that when fighting erupted in England “one or the other of the rivals is master within ten days or less” (Gillingham, p. 28). With sieges largely unnecessary and the problem of supply making it difficult to keep large armies in the field for long periods, active campaigning, as shown in the following table, occupied less than year and a half of the more than thirty-year period encompassing the Wars of the Roses.
Further Reading: Gillingham, John, The Wars of the Roses (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981); Goodman, Anthony, The Wars of the Roses (New York: Dorset Press, 1981); Ross, Charles, The Wars of the Roses (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987).
From the first Battle of ST. ALBANS in May 1455 to the Battle of STOKE in June 1487, adherents of the houses of LANCASTER and YORK engaged in thirteen major battles, such as those at TOWTON, BARNET, and BOSWORTH FIELD; several smaller encounters, such as the Battles of TWT HILL and HEXHAM; and numerous raids, rebellions, and assaults on castles. However, most of this fighting across a span of more than thirty years was compressed into a few active phases of two to three years, within which large armed forces were actually in the field for only a matter of weeks. The main periods of active campaigning occurred between the autumn of 1459 and the spring of 1461, the summer of 1469 and the spring of 1471, and in the autumn of 1483 and the summers of 1485 and 1487.
Being an island kingdom, England had not experienced the nearly continuous warfare that the HUNDRED YEARS WAR and other conflicts and rebellions had brought in the previous century to FRANCE, BURGUNDY, and other continental states. As a result, England lacked the standing armies (and the arbitrary taxation that supported them) that had developed in France under CHARLES VII and in Burgundy under Dukes PHILIP and CHARLES. The only ongoing military establishments in fifteenth-century England were a royal bodyguard of 200 archers created in 1468, the 1,000-man CALAIS garrison, and the forces raised at Crown expense by the wardens of the marches to defend the borders with SCOTLAND. The important role that elements of the Calais garrison had in the outcome of several battles, such as LUDFORD BRIDGE in 1459, illustrated how nonmilitarized England was.
This lack of military experience meant that England lagged behind the continent in the use of ARTILLERY and handguns and in the development of military fortification. Whereas an avoidance of pitched battle and a highly developed siegecraft characterized continental warfare, the Wars of the Roses witnessed almost no sieges, no sacks of major towns, little pillage or destruction of the countryside, and a series of brief campaigns and pitched battles, the winner of which usually gained immediate control of the government. In his MEMOIRS, the Burgundian chronicler Philippe de Commines observed that the English “were the most inclined to give battle” and that when fighting erupted in England “one or the other of the rivals is master within ten days or less” (Gillingham, p. 28). With sieges largely unnecessary and the problem of supply making it difficult to keep large armies in the field for long periods, active campaigning, as shown in the following table, occupied less than year and a half of the more than thirty-year period encompassing the Wars of the Roses.
Further Reading: Gillingham, John, The Wars of the Roses (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981); Goodman, Anthony, The Wars of the Roses (New York: Dorset Press, 1981); Ross, Charles, The Wars of the Roses (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987).
Monday, January 4, 2016
THE DYNASTIC BACKGROUND TO THE WARS OF THE ROSES
Edward III had seven sons. Of those who survived infancy the
four eldest were: his heir - Edward (the Black Prince), Lionel (Duke of
Clarence), John of Gaunt (Duke of Lancaster), and Edmund Langley (Duke of
York). As the Black Prince predeceased his father by a year, it was his son who
eventually succeeded to the throne in 1377, becoming Richard II.
Richard's reign witnessed both peasant revolts and
aristocratic conspiracies. Successive disputes with the nobility eventually led
to his downfall. In 1399, Richard's cousin Henry Bolingbroke, the eldest son of
John of Gaunt (Edward III's third son), usurped the throne, had Richard
executed and founded the ruling dynasty of Lancaster as Henry IV.
Henry's claim to the throne rested on his being the next
surviving male heir. Unfortunately for him, there was a rival claim through the
line of Philippa, daughter of Edward III's second son - the Duke of Clarence.
Philippa had married Edmund Mortimer, Earl of March, by whom she had a son;
thus founding the claim of the House of Mortimer.
In 1425, Richard Duke of York, the grandson of Edmund
Langley (Edward III's fourth son) was to inherit the Mortimer claim through his
maternal uncle. He was to prove a formidable rival to his distant cousin, the
weak-minded Henry VI of the House of Lancaster who alienated the Duke by
borrowing vast sums of money he never repaid.
Wednesday, August 12, 2015
Stoke – the last battle
In recounting how Lady Margaret had wept at her son’s
coronation, Fisher makes it clear that she did so from foreboding rather than
joy. Many people in the north and in Wales, who had done very well under
Richard, disliked the new regime. So did the English-speaking Irish of the
Pale, traditionally loyal to the House of York. In the Low Countries the late
King’s sister, Margaret of York – ‘mine old lady of Burgundy’ – was ready to
welcome any of his former supporters who were in need of a refuge or who
required a base from which to launch an invasion of England.
During April 1486 Sir Humphrey Stafford tried to raise his
native Worcestershire against Henry VII while Lord Lovell, once King Richard’s
Lord Chamberlain (‘Lovell our Dog’), attempted a rebellion in the North Riding.
However, their candidate for the throne, the Earl of Warwick – Clarence’s son –
was a prisoner in the hands of Margaret Beaufort, and they failed to win any
significant support. Sir Humphrey Stafford was dragged out of sanctuary and
beheaded, though Lovell got away.
On 19 May Lady Oxford wrote to her husband’s old ally, John
Paston, in his capacity as Sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk.
I am credibly informed
that Francis, late Lord Lovell is now of late resorted to the Isle of Ely to
the intent, by all likelihood, to get him shipping and passage in your coasts,
or else to resort again to sanctuary if he may. I therefore heartily desire . .
. that ye in all goodly haste endeavour yourself that such watch or other means
be used and had in the ports and creeks . . . to the taking of the same late
Lord Lovell. And what pleasure ye may do to the King’s Grace in this matter I
am sure is not to you unknown.
The Countess had good reason to dislike Yorkists, but
despite all her precautions Lovell succeeded in escaping to Burgundy.
Early in the spring of 1487 a priest brought an Oxford
organ-builder’s son called Lambert Simnel to Dublin, pretending that the boy
was the Earl of Warwick. Lambert was immediately hailed as king by the Irish
Chancellor, Sir Thomas FitzGerald of Lackagh, a brother of the Earl of Kildare
who was the most powerful man in Ireland. The FitzGeralds quickly contacted the
Yorkist dissidents who had taken refuge in Flanders. Their leaders were Lord
Lovell and John de la Pole, Earl of Lincoln, whom Richard III had recognized as
his heir presumptive. The Yorkists and the FitzGeralds agreed that they should
invade England together as soon as possible. They were warmly encouraged by
Margaret of York who, according to Vergil, ‘pursued Henry [VII] with insatiable
hatred and with fiery wrath never desisted from every scheme which might harm
him’. She gave them money and troops.
On Whit Sunday 1487 (24 May) Lambert, after having been
recognized formally as its sovereign by the Irish Parliament, was crowned and
anointed as ‘King Edward VI’ by the Archbishop of Dublin in Christchurch
Cathedral. No proper crown was available so a diadem was borrowed from a statue
of the Virgin. Another important Irish prelate, the Dominican Bishop of Meath,
preached the coronation sermon.
Always on the alert, despite conflicting information from
his many spies, Henry VII had already begun to suspect that a Yorkist invasion
was imminent. His first concern was for the safety of the Queen and his mother.
‘We pray you that, giving your attendance upon our said dearest wife and lady
mother, ye come with them to us’, he wrote urgently to the Queen’s chamberlain,
the Earl of Ormonde.7 On 13 May the King summoned Lord Oxford to Kenilworth
Castle, to discuss how they should prepare for the looming campaign.
By that time Lord Lovell and the Earl of Lincoln had landed
at Dublin with a band of Yorkist diehards. They were accompanied by 2,000 Swiss
and German mercenaries under the renowned Colonel Martin Schwarz (once an
Augsburg cobbler), who had been hired by ‘mine old lady of Burgundy’.
Reinforced by the FitzGeralds, they sailed across to Lancashire, landing on the
Furness peninsula, not far from Lancaster, on 4 June.
The Yorkist strategy seems to have been to march as far
south as possible after crossing the Pennines before giving battle. Although
the citizens of York failed to respond to a letter sent to them from Masham by
‘Edward VI’, and beat off an attempt to occupy their city by the two Lord
Scropes, the Earl of Lincoln was surprisingly confident. Probably he was
counting not only on the excellent quality of his troops but on the
intervention of secret allies as at Bosworth once the two armies were engaged.
Nothing else can explain his extraordinary optimism. Vergil was convinced that
Lincoln (who may have planted Lambert Simnel on the Irish) was planning to
seize the throne for himself as soon as Henry VII had been defeated. But
Lambert was far too unconvincing a pretender to win much support, and no more
than a score of knights and squires joined the Yorkists. Moreover, as a
commander Lincoln was scarcely in the same league as the Earl of Oxford.
Christopher Urswick brought King Henry the news that the
Yorkist expedition had landed in Lancashire. Although no overall figures are
available, it is clear that the King had sufficient support from his magnates
to be able to assemble an impressively large army. Vergil names more than sixty
gentlemen of substance who served in it, and afterwards an unprecedented number
of knights were created. It included 6,000 men provided by the Stanleys alone,
the King’s stepfather sending every retainer and well-wisher he could muster
under his son, Lord Strange. Among the other peers who rallied to the King was
William Hastings’ son Edward, who had been restored to his father’s barony and
estates. Archbishop Morton, accompanied by his nephew, the Bishop of Worcester,
brought a substantial force of retainers and of tenants from his wide estates.
So did the Courtenay Bishop of Winchester.
The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishops of Worcester
and Winchester were the first prelates to bring troops to a battle during the
Wars of the Roses. However, it will be remembered that Dr Morton was no
stranger to battlefields and might even be described as a veteran campaigner.
He had been present at the second St Albans and Towton, had been besieged in
the grim Northumbrian sieges of the 1460s, had been taken prisoner at
Tewkesbury, and had been amid the collapse of the Duke of Buckingham’s
disastrous rebellion four years before. Although nearly seventy by now, John
Morton was leaving nothing to chance – he did not underestimate the danger from
the Yorkists. He rode with his troops as far as Loughborough in Leicestershire
before handing over command to his nephew, Robert. They were going to fight in
the front ranks, in Lord Oxford’s contingent.
As Professor Ross stresses, the battle about to take place
could have gone either way. Treachery might have lost it for Henry VII just as
treachery had lost Bosworth for Richard III. Obviously the King suspected some
sort of plot. There can be no other explanation for his ordering Oxford to
place the Marquess of Dorset under arrest before he could join the royal army.
Despite being outnumbered, Lord Lincoln, the enemy
commander, was only too eager to give battle. At 9 a.m. on 16 June the
Yorkists, about 9,000 strong, engaged the royal army which was in three columns
drawn up in echelon (one behind the other) outside the village of Stoke, a few
miles from Newark. Schwarz’s landsknechts were obviously professionals to their
fingertips, while Lincoln’s followers and the Irish gentlemen were well armed.
However, the barefooted, saffron-shirted Irish kern who formed the bulk of their
force were a different matter, being without any form of armour and equipped
merely with axes, long knives and javelins.
The Earl of Oxford commanded the King’s vanguard or front
column, which alone engaged the enemy. Clearly Lincoln’s men fought with great
courage, but the unarmoured Irish suffered appalling casualties, one report
saying that 4,000 of them were killed. Eventually Oxford won the day with a
final determined charge. Schwarz’s men fought to the death by the side of their
colonel. Among the many other casualties were Lincoln and Sir Thomas
FitzGerald. Lord Lovell – King Richard’s old friend – was last seen swimming
his horse across the River Trent.
The Yorkist diehards would never again dare to challenge the
Tudors in armed confrontation, and they went underground. Yet their cause was
far from dead. Nor had Henry’s victory been a foregone conclusion. Northern
noblemen had joined the rebellion, such as the two Lord Scropes, while the
Bishop of St Asaph, Dr Richard Redmayne, was suspected of involvement.
Significantly, when a mistaken rumour that Henry had been defeated reached
London, riots broke out in favour of the Earl of Warwick. A City chronicler
tells of ‘false Englishmen . . . which untrue persons said that the king was
lost and the field was lost’. Yorkists emerged from their sanctuaries to attack
royal officials, shouting that Warwick was King. If the Earl had been old
enough and of the same calibre as his uncles, he could have escaped from the
Tower of London, and there might easily have been another Yorkist restoration.
Henry Tudor and the Navy
Henry Tudor landing in Wales. After defeating Warwick and regaining the
throne Edward began rebuilding the royal fleet by constructing ships and
gathering a new cadre of experienced ship's masters. In the 1460s, he had built
the first English royal caravel, the Edward, and, after 1471, he constructed
fleets to support his invasions of France (1475) and SCOTLAND (early 1480s).
Although still meant to carry land troops to fight battles at sea, caravels
were smaller, faster vessels than Henry V's high, bulky carracks, and they
foreshadowed the quick, agile vessels with which Elizabethan England later
defied the might of Spain. Despite these achievements, Edward still desired a
small, inexpensive navy, and he maintained his fleet largely to protect trade
and intercept invaders, a task that RICHARD III's flotilla of watching vessels
failed to accomplish in August 1485 when Henry Tudor, earl of Richmond, set
sail for WALES.
After defeating and killing Richard at the Battle of BOSWORTH FIELD,
Richmond, now HENRY VII, continued the naval policy of Edward IV, building new
ships and establishing a naval base at Southampton. However, he still indented
for vessels when he took an army to defend BRITTANY in 1492, and he, like his
predecessor, lacked the naval strength to intercept the invasion forces of such
Yorkist pretenders as Lambert SIMNEL and Perkin WARBECK, who both had to be
defeated in land battles after their arrival in England.
The small navy that Henry VIII inherited from his father had only two
sizeable ships, the carracks Regent and Sovereign.
Naval matters were able to open the royal purse. Henry VII
began the build up at sea that would characterise the Tudor time. At a cost of
£14.000 he let build the Great Harry, England's first warship in the sense that
it was the first ship to be built solely for the purpose of fighting at sea.
Great Harry was followed by more ships and Henry VII had soon created a
respectable navy, earning him the name "the Grandfather of the Royal
Navy". Henry's days also saw the first English explorers. Henry turned
down an offer from Christopher Columbus's brother Bartholomeus to finance a
journey westwards. Later John Cabot won the Kings ear and explored Newfoundland,
thus becoming the first European to set his foot on the American mainland.
Henry VII
By late summer 1483, Richard III's usurpation of the English
Crown and the growing belief that he had murdered his nephews made Richmond a
more attractive candidate for the throne (see USURPATION OF 1483). While
Richmond's mother plotted with Queen Elizabeth WOODVILLE to put the earl on the
throne and marry him to ELIZABETH OF YORK, daughter of Edward IV, Henry
STAFFORD, duke of Buckingham, deserted Richard and hatched his own plot. In the
autumn, the two conspiracies merged into BUCKINGHAM'S REBELLION, an unsuccessful
uprising that Richmond himself supported with an abortive descent on the
English coast. Although Richard's soldiers tried to draw the earl ashore by
posing as friends, Richmond learned of Buckingham's failure and returned safely
to Brittany. In 1484, as a growing body of English exiles collected around him,
Richmond fled into France, foiling a plot by Pierre Landais to turn him over to
Richard's agents.
With French assistance, Richmond and his uncle landed in
Wales in August 1485. Leading a force of over 2,000 French and Scottish
mercenaries and some 600 English supporters, Richmond crossed Wales and entered
England, collecting support along the way from both old Lancastrians and
disaffected Yorkists. However, his army was still smaller than the king's when
he met Richard in battle near the village of Market Bosworth on 22 August.
Defeated by disloyalty in his ranks and by the intervention on Richmond's side
of Sir William STANLEY, brother of Thomas STANLEY, Lord Stanley (Richmond's
stepfather), Richard was killed on the field, and Richmond was proclaimed king
as Henry VII.
As heir of Lancaster, Henry sought to symbolically end the
WARS OF THE ROSES by marrying Elizabeth, the heiress of York, in January 1486.
Nonetheless, Henry spent much of his reign combating Yorkist attempts to regain
the throne. In June 1487, he defeated the partisans of Lambert SIMNEL at the
Battle of STOKE. Simnel claimed to be Edward PLANTAGENET, earl of Warwick, the
nephew of Edward IV and the last Yorkist claimant in the direct male line. A
prisoner in the TOWER OF LONDON since 1485, Warwick was executed in 1499 after
being implicated in an escape plot with Perkin WARBECK, another Yorkist
pretender who had troubled Henry throughout the 1490s by claiming to be Richard
PLANTAGENET, duke of York, the younger son of Edward IV, who had probably died
in the Tower with his brother EDWARD V in 1483. Despite these and other Yorkist
threats to his dynasty, Henry VII, at his death on 21 April 1509, peacefully
passed a stable and strengthened Crown to his son Henry VIII.
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