Medieval society thoroughly encouraged young males of social
standing to seek glory in war. They were provided with role models
both in fiction—as in the Arthurian legends or the French “chansons
de geste”—and in tales of the feats of contemporary real-life
heroes such as England’s Black Prince or Bertrand du Guesclin, the
constable of France. The Church sanctified the practice of war, at
least if directed against “infidels” or in some other just cause,
and the code of chivalry established principles of conduct that a
knight should follow.
Chivalry incorporated many of the usual principles of warrior
morality, such as loyalty to your leader or to your
brothers-in-arms, together with Christian-derived values such as
respect for the poor and needy. But the chivalric code was also a
practical arrangement between knights to limit the risks of
warfare. Being of the same rank and often related by blood or
marriage, opposing knights had an interest in avoiding a fight to
the death. If they were facing defeat, they could usually surrender
in the confident expectation of being treated well as prisoners and
eventually ransomed—although there were exceptions to this rule, as
when the English King Henry V ordered the killing of French
prisoners at Agincourt in 1415.
Ransoms could be considerable sums of money, so there was
obviously a profit motive at work in the preservation of prisoners’
lives. However much knights might be inspired by the prospect of
honor and glory, they usually also had material goals in sight.
Many knights were far from wealthy. They might hold fiefs that were
small plots of land similar to those worked by peasant families, or
they could be younger sons with no expectation of an inheritance.
Skill in the use of arms gave a man a chance to better himself. He
could forge a distinguished military career, as Bertrand du
Guesclin did from unpromising provincial origins, or win lands
through participating in conquest, as happened during the
Crusades.
COSTLY ROLE
Kings increasingly assumed the exclusive right to confer
knighthoods and used this as a means of raising revenue, charging a
hefty fee for the privilege. By the 14th century, many qualified by
birth to be knights tried to avoid the expense and onerous duties
it involved. As well as the cost of the accolade, there was a
substantial outlay for equipment and mounts. A knight needed at
least two horses when on campaign—a palfrey, or saddle horse, for
ordinary travel and a splendid destrier, or warhorse, for combat.
Full plate armor, which gradually replaced the mix of chainmail and
plate, was very expensive, shaped to offer protection against
missiles and sword blows, yet light and well balanced enough to be
comfortable when fighting on foot. The knight would also need a
lance, a sword, a shield, and probably a mace, war-hammer, or
poleax.
Many young men with military ambitions were prepared to pay for
the horses and gear but baulked at the cost of a knighthood, or
lacked the requisite birth qualification. They remained squires or
sergeants, fighting alongside the knights and largely
indistinguishable from them on the battlefield. A squire or
sergeant might hope to receive an accolade on the battlefield in
recognition of some spectacular feat of arms, though such
on-the-spot knightings were not common. Knights, squires, and
sergeants were collectively known as “men-at-arms”.
Knights broadly fitted into the system of personal loyalty and
mutual obligation that shaped medieval society. They might, for
example, owe military service as vassals or liegemen to a lord or
king in return for a grant of land held as a fief—the classic
pattern of the “feudal” system. But in the later Middle Ages
monetary arrangements progressively came to the fore. Whether
knights lived on their own land or as retainers in a noble
household, by the 14th century they would expect to be paid for
their services, even though the service was recognized as a feudal
obligation. By the same token, they could often pay money in lieu
of service—shield tax or “scutage.”
Knights were not always so lofty in their pretensions. Others
became outright mercenaries, leading “free companies” that were in
effect private professional armies, selling their services to
cities and states, none of which could afford to maintain permanent
standing armies. Thus the force that a medieval king led off to war
would be far from homogenous. It might include his own household
knights, his barons or lords and their feudal followers,
contingents provided by the military orders, and mercenaries led by
their own chiefs. At worst, during times of disorder and social
breakdown, knights might degenerate into brigands, using their
skills to carve out a dishonest living through robbery, plunder,
and pillage.
Well-made armor offered excellent protection and gave a knight
full mobility to wield his lance, sword, or ax, in the saddle or
out of it. The shock of close-quarters combat was, of course,
intense and put a premium upon physical strength and endurance,
especially if hot weather made the weight of the armor hard to
bear. But fortified by their code of personal honor and duty,
knights rarely flinched once combat was joined. Their chief
weakness lay in the intemperate aggression and quarrelsomeness of
hot-headed individuals bent upon glory. Chronicles of medieval
warfare tell time and again of groups of knights unwisely breaking
ranks to charge a superior enemy in a self-conscious show of
competitive bravery, often in defiance of a battle plan agreed in
advance. The knights’ discipline rarely matched their valor.
Even in the 14th century, the battlefield dominance of knights
was challenged by lightly armored foot soldiers at Courtrai and
Bannockburn and by archers at Crécy. From the second half of the
15th century, gunpowder weapons were increasingly effective, as
were disciplined infantry armed with pikes. But armored cavalry was
not driven from the battlefield by arrows, cannon or arquebuses. In
something close to its medieval form it remained an important
element in battles into the late 16th century. By then, however,
the social and cultural basis of knighthood had declined with an
increase in central state power and the inexorable rise of
professional soldiering.
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