A ship from Richard III's
reign.
In the absence of royal initiative in England,
however, there were others who were willing and able to wield the
strength derived from a force of ships to intervene in the
increasingly complex struggles between competing factions and
claimants to the throne. This is most clearly seen in the case of
the Earl of Warwick, but the Duke of Burgundy and the king of
France were also prepared to provide naval forces to support their
favoured candidate for the English throne. Richard Neville, Earl of
Warwick had been captain of Calais since 1456 and had taken the
opportunity afforded by a relatively secure base to build up a
squadron of ships. These were used in the manner most likely to
advance the fortunes of the Earl himself and the Yorkist cause,
which, at that time, he supported. To many English men his naval
exploits in the Channel were a welcome sign of 'enterprise upon the
see'. Jack Cade's proclamation in 1450 at the outset of the Kentish
rebellion had bewailed the facts that, 'the sea is lost, France is
lost'. The French raid on Sandwich in August 1457 had been a
humiliating reminder of the impotence of English defence. Now John
Bale, himself a merchant and a ship-owner, could laud Warwick in
his chronicle, praising his 'greet pollecy and dedes doyng of
worship in fortefieng of Cales and other feates of armes'. To
modern writers Warwick's deeds seem at least semi-piratical but to
his contemporaries his attack on a Spanish squadron of 28 sail off
Calais in early June 1458 and his taking of around 17 prizes out of
the Hanse fleet returning with Bay salt later the same summer were
victories to savour. It even seems not to have affected his
reputation that the first engagement was not entirely successful.
John Jernyngham's letter to Margaret Paston which gives details of
the encounter, recounts how he and his crew boarded a large Spanish
ship but were unable to hold her. He concludes, 'and for sooth we
were well and truly beat'. The point to contemporaries was that
Warwick, who was in fact bound by an indenture of November 1457 to
keep the seas, seemed to be acting energetically and speedily even
if not all his opponents were clearly 'the londes adversaries'.
His activities in 1459 and 1460 demonstrate
with greater force the way in which the possession of a squadron of
ships with experienced crews was greatly to the political advantage
of both Warwick personally and the Yorkist cause. After plundering
Spanish and Genoese shipping in the Straits in the summer of 1459,
Warwick, who had joined the Yorkists in England, seemed to have
miscalculated when he was forced to flee from the battle of Ludford
Bridge. He reached his base in Calais safely, however, and from
that point acted with great skill. Lord Rivers and Sir Gervase
Clifton for the king had by December managed to impound Warwick's
ships in Sandwich harbour. The Crown also mustered a small force
under William Scott to patrol off Winchelsea to repel any attack by
Warwick. Warwick had many friends in the Southern counties, perhaps
beneficiaries of his earlier actions in the Channel. Through them
he was well aware of the Crown's plans. In January a force from
Calais commanded by John Dinham, slipped into Sandwich early in the
morning, while Rivers was still abed, and persuaded Warwick's
erstwhile shipmasters and crews to return with them to Calais. The
royal government attempted to counter this loss by commissioning
further forces to serve at sea against Warwick. The Duke of Exeter
in May 1460 in fact encountered Warwick's fleet at some point to
the east of Dartmouth and arguably had the opportunity at least to
damage very severely the Yorkist cause if not put paid to it
entirely. Yet as the Great Chronicle of London put it 'they fowght
not'. Richmond sees this as 'one of those critical moments when
action was essential but was not forthcoming'. In his view Warwick
had what the Crown did not, a fleet and a fleet which was used to
keep the sea. The use of that fleet was an important factor in the
course taken by the domestic politics of England and to Richmond
sealed the fate of the Lancastrians.
In 1470, Warwick was personally in a much
weaker position. He may still have had some vessels of his own; on
his flight from England, after the failure of his intrigues on
behalf of the Duke of Clarence, pursued by Lord Howard, he had
taken prizes from the Burgundians. He could not, however from his
own resources hope to mount an invasion of England to restore his
new master Henry VI. He and Queen Margaret were dependent on the
aid of Louis XI of France to provide such a fleet. This aid was
forthcoming because of the seeming advantage to France in the
restoration of the Lancastrians and their adherence to an alliance
against Burgundy. Both English and Burgundian naval forces,
however, were at sea all summer in an endeavour to keep Warwick's
French fleet in port. Their efforts seemed successful; by August
Warwick's men were demanding their pay and the people of Barfleur
and Valognes had had enough of their presence. A summer gale then
dispersed the Yorkist ships at sea and Warwick sailed across
unopposed landing on 9 September near Exeter. By the end of the
month Edward IV was himself a fugitive restlessly watching the
North Sea from his refuge at Bruges with Louis de Gruthuyse, the
Burgundian governor of Holland. If he in his turn was to regain his
throne his need also was for ships. The Duke of Burgundy was
perhaps more discreet in his support for his brother-in-law than
Louis XI had been for his cousin, Margaret of Anjou. In March 1471,
however, Edward left Flushing with 36 ships and about 2000 men and
once ashore at Ravenspur by guile and good luck recovered his
Crown.
In the 20 or so years from 1455, therefore, it
can be argued that the possession of the potential for naval
warfare could be of great advantage to those who wished to be major
players in both internal and external politics. No very great or
glorious encounters between the vessels of rival powers took place
in the Channel or the North Sea. The typical action was that of the
commerce raider; a brief violent boarding action ending probably in
the surrender of the weaker crew in an attempt to save their skins.
Kings and other rulers possessed very few or no ships of their own
and were reliant on the general resources of the maritime
community. Yet, despite this, the perception of the pressure, which
could be exerted by a fleet in being, was more widely appreciated.
Warwick has been held up as the individual whose actions
demonstrate this most clearly and it is hard to argue against this
opinion. He, perhaps, until the fatal moment on the field at the
battle of Barnet, also had luck. Would he have fared well if Exeter
had attacked off Dartmouth in 1460? The reasons for Exeter's loss
of nerve are not really clear. Exeter had many warships including
the Grace Dieu, built by John Tavener of Hull and formerly
Warwick's own flagship. The Great Chronicle of London speaks
vaguely of Exeter's crews being unwilling to oppose Warwick while
the English Chronicle states baldly that Exeter was afraid to
fight. Waurin, a Burgundian chronicler, has a circumstantial
account of Warwick approaching the coming conflict with great
circumspection, sending out fast small vessels ahead of the main
fleet to gather intelligence and then calling a council of war of
all his ship masters.47 The decision was taken to attack with
vigour and maybe the sight of Warwick's ships coming on at speed
with the advantage of the wind terrified Exeter. His lack of
courage was certainly a disastrous blow for his party.
On a wider canvas, the situation in these
waters as far as the relations between rulers goes has become much
more open. In the first third of the century the conflict between
England and France was the dominant factor with other states being
drawn in as allies of one or the other combatant. After the middle
of the century states pursued their own commercial and political
interests in a more fluid situation. Naval power was diffuse, not
necessarily concentrated in government hands, and the advantage
might swing quickly from one state or group of traders to
another.
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